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PREVENTING BIDDING WARS IN WASHINGTON
ADOPTIONS: THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
AFTER 1NRE DEPENDENCY OF G.C.B.
Shannon E. Phillips
Abstract- In In re Dependency of G.C.B., a Washington court of appeals held that an
individual whose parental relationship was involuntarily terminated under the dependency
statute lacks standing to later petition to adopt that same child. This Note argues that the
Washington adoption statute would not necessarily prevent an equivocating parent who
voluntarily relinquished her child from attempting to undo the finality of termination by later
seeking to adopt. Nor does the statute effectively limit who can petition to adopt a child to
individuals who have been chosen by the child's custodian or who have had the child placed
with them. The Note proposes that the Washington adoption statute should be amended to
ensure that parents whose relationship with a child is terminated cannot later attempt to relitigate that issue through adoption, and further proposes that eligibility to petition to adopt
should be limited so that the child's best interests, not the desires of competing adults, are
served.

"Living with a gay couple is not what I want for my child .... He

deserves a normal, healthy life with me."' So said a biological mother
more than a year after her parental rights were terminated under
Washington's dependency statute following her voluntary relinquishment
of the child to the Washington Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS) for adoption purposes.' When she learned that the department
planned to place her son with a homosexual couple, she began a legal
battle to regain custody.3 First, she alleged that her consent had been
obtained through coercion when she was mentally incompetent.4 While
that action was pending, she and her current husband-not the child's
biological father-filed a petition to adopt the child.5 A Washington trial
court found that the woman and her husband were, as a matter of law,
strangers to the child and thus had the same right to petition to adopt the
child as any other person under Washington's adoption law.6

1.Michele Ingrassia & Melissa Rossi, The Limits of Tolerance,Newsweek, Feb. 14, 1994, at 47.
2. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708,710-11, 870 P.2d 1037, 1039, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
3. Id. at 711-12, 870 P.2d at 1040.
4. Id. at 712, 870 P.2d at 1040.
5. Id. at 713, 870 P.2dat 1040.
6. Id. at 715, 870 P.2d at 1042.
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In April 1994, a Washington appellate court held in In re Dependency
of G.C.B.7 that the biological mother did not have standing to petition to
adopt the child!
The court reasoned that the statutory provision
governing the termination of her parental rights deprived her of standing
to appear in any further legal proceedings concerning the child.'
Although the court was able to dismiss the petition of the biological
mother, the case raises the following questions regarding parental
termination and adoption under the Washington adoption statute: (1)
whether an individual whose parental relationship has been terminated
under the adoption statute, as opposed to the dependency statute, may
later petition to adopt that same child; and (2) whether there are any
limitations on who can petition to adopt a specific child. An examination
of these issues reveals the need to amend the Washington adoption
statute in order to ensure that a parent whose relationship with a child has
been terminated cannot re-establish that relationship through adoption,
regardless of whether the termination was entered under the dependency
or adoption statute. The statute should also be amended to limit standing
to petition to adopt a specific child. These statutory changes will
promote continuity of care for the child, maintain the integrity of the
public adoption system, and ensure that adoption decisions reflect the
best interests of the child rather than the interests of competing adults.
Part I of this Note provides background on Washington adoption law,
particularly with respect to the laws concerning how children are freed
for adoption, adoption procedure, and limits on revocation of parental
relinquishment and consent to adoption. Part II describes the facts,
holding, and dicta in In re Dependency of G.C.B. Part III analyzes the
issues raised by the case.
Last, Part IV recomimends statutory
amendments to the provisions governing termination of parental rights
and standing to petition to adopt.
I.

ADOPTION IN WASHINGTON

Adoption is the process by which a court ° gives individuals who are
not biologically parent and child the legal status of parent and child."
7. 73 Wash. App. 708, 870 P.2d 1037 (1994).
8. Id. at 717, 870 P.2d at 1042.
9. Id.
10. Adoption is a statutory creation that did not exist at common law. In re Parsons, 76 Wash. 2d
437, 440-41,457 P.2d 544, 546 (1969). The statutes governing adoption thus are strictly construed
by Washington courts, although not so narrowly as to deny effect to their manifest intent and
beneficial aims. In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 326, 623 P.2d 702, 707, r'view denied, 95 Wash.
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Adoption addresses the societal need to find stable families for children
who are neglected, abused, or unwanted by their biological parents. 2
Additionally, adoption frees biological parents from the burden of raising
a child whom they do not want or who they believe would be better off
with different parents. It also offers childless individuals an opportunity
to be parents."
The stated purpose of adoption in Washington is to find stable homes
for children. 4 The principle guiding judicial determinations in adoption
proceedings is the best interests of the child.15 The Washington statute
does not specify the factors to be considered by courts in determining the
best interests of a child. A judge may thus exercise wide discretion in6
determining what constitutes the best interests of a particular child.'
Although the interests of the child are primary, the statute also specifies
that the rights of all parties involved in the adoption process--children,
7
biological parents, and adoptive parents-must be protected.'
A.

Relinquishment and Terminationof ParentalRights

In Washington, a child may be relinquished for adoption in one of two
ways. Under the adoption statute, a parent may petition to voluntarily
relinquish or surrender a child to DSHS, an adoption agency, or directly
to a prospective adoptive parent.' 8 A written consent to adoption must
If a court approves the petition for
accompany the petition. 19
2d 1019 (1981). In 1984, the existing Washington adoption statute was replaced by a reorganized
code. The new adoption code retained many aspects of the previous code, while eliminating
confusing or duplicative features caused by amendments to the statute in the years since it first was
enacted in 1943. Final Legislative Report, 48th Washington State Legislature, 1984 Regular Session
39 (1984).
11. Joan H. Hollinger et al., Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice,Adoption Law and
Practice§ 1.01[1] (1992).
12. In re Adoption of Baby Nancy, 27 Wash. App. 278, 283, 616 P.2d 1263, 1266 (1980), review
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1001 (1981).
13. Hollinger, supra note 11, § 1.01[1].
14. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.010 (1994).
15. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.010 (1994).
16. In re Hamilton, 41 Wash. 2d 53, 56, 246 P.2d 849, 851 (1952).
17. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.010 (1994); see also In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 121,346 P.2d
672,674 (1959).
18. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.080 (1994). Because In re Dependency of G.C.B. involved a child
who was available for adoption through DSHS, this Note will focus on the issues raised relating to
adoption through the department or agencies, not private adoptions.
19. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.080(1) (1994).
father. Id.

Consent is required from the parent or alleged
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relinquishment to an agency or DSHS, it must enter an order terminating
the parent-child relationship and authorizing the custodial agency to
place the child with a prospective adoptive parent.20 Although a court
must approve a petition for relinquishment, the judicial proceedings are
voluntary and nonadversarial. 2'
Alternatively, a child may be declared "dependent" under the
Washington dependency statute' and placed in the custody of the state.
Dependency proceedings begin when any person files a petition alleging
that the child has been abandoned, abused, or neglected, or that the
child's psychological or physical development is in danger because he or
she has no parent capable of providing adequate care.' The legislature
has expressed a preference that families remain intact, unless a child's
right to basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized.24 More
importantly, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
biological parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody,
and control of his or her child.' However, the state has a right and
obligation to intervene when the child needs protection from a parent.26
If the court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that certain
specific allegations27 are established, it may order the termination of the

20. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.090 (1994).
21. In re Adoption of Hernandez, 25 Wash. App. 447,452, 607 P.2d 879, 882 (1980).
22. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.010-.310 (1994).
23. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.030-.040 (1994).
24. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.020 (1994).
25. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
26. In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108,110 (1980).
27. Washington's dependency statute provides that an order terminating the parent-child
relationship must allege the following:
(1) That the child has been found to be a deiendent child under *RCW 13.34.030(2); and
(2) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130; and
(3) That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, have been removed from
the custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency
under *RCW 13.34.030(2); and
(4) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.130 have been offered or provided and all
necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within
the foreseeable future have been offered or provided, and
(5) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be
returned to the parent in the near future. In determining whether the conditions will be remedied
the court may consider, but is not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Use of intoxicating or controlled substances so as to render the parent incapable of
providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time and documented unwillingness
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parent-child relationship.28 If no other person has parental rights
following the termination order, the court must commit the child to the
custody of DSHS or a licensed child-placement agency for the purpose
of placing the child for adoption.29
The termination of the parent-child relationship can involve an
overlap between the juvenile dependency and adoption statutes. For
example, it is not uncommon for biological parents to relinquish their
children to state agencies after being threatened with an involuntary
termination action." The significance of this overlap lies in the fact that
the termination provisions under each statute are similar but not
identical. A termination order under either the adoption or dependency
statute severs all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and
obligations of the parent.3 However, the termination provision in the
dependency statute further provides that "the parent shall have no
standing to appear at any further legal proceedings concerning the
child."3 2 In contrast, the adoption statute provides that an individual
whose parent-child relationship has been terminated
is not thereafter entitled to notice of proceedings for the adoption of
the child by another, nor has the parent or alleged father any right
to contest the adoption or otherwise to participate in the

of the parent to receive and complete treatment or documented multiple failed treatment
attempts; or
(b) Psychological incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent that is so severe and chronic as
to render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of
time, and documented unwillingness of the parent to receive and complete treatment or
documentation that there is no treatment that can render the parent capable of providing proper
care for the child in the near future; and
(6) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's
prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home; or
(7) In lieu of the allegations in subsections (1) through (6) of this section, the petition may
allege that the child was found under such circumstances that the whereabouts of the child's
parent are unknown ....
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180 (1994). [*Wash. Rev. Code 13.34.030 was amended by Laws 1994,
ch. 288, § 1, changing subsection (2) to subsection (4).]
28. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.190 (1994).
29. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.210 (1994).
30. Hollinger, supra note 11, § 1.05[2][d]. The case of G.C.B. demonstrates this overlap, in that
Megan Lucas has said that she was told by DSHS that "if I didn't relinquish, they would just take
him." Sonya Live, CNN, Sept. 28, 1993, availablein, LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File.
31. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.33.130, 13.34.200 (1994).
32. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.200(1) (1994).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:277, 1995

proceedings unless an appeal from the termination order is pending
or unless otherwise ordered by the court.33
B.

Limitations on ParentalAttempts to Revoke Consent

Once a relinquishment and consent to adoption has been approved by
a court, it may not be revoked except for fraud or duress by the person
requesting consent or for mental incompetency on the part of the person
giving the consent.34 A biological parent seeking to set aside a
relinquishment must establish one of these grounds by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.35 Washington courts have held ihat inexperience,
emotional stress, uncertainty, and indecisiveness are insufficient bases
for a revocation. 36 A written consent may not under any circumstances
be revoked more than one year after it has been approved by the court.37
The limited revocability of relinquishment reflects an important
objective of the relinquishment and adoption statutes: protecting the
adopting parents, the child, and the new family from later intrusion by
the biological parents." Thus, courts have found it contrary to the best
interests of the child and the public's interest in the finality of adoption
procedures to allow a biological parent to subject a child to another
change of custody after the child has been voluntarily relinquished.39
Also, allowing the consent to be revoked too easily could discourage
prospective adoptive parents because they might lcse a child after
emotional attachments have developed. 0

33. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.130(4) (1994I).
34. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160(3) (1994) provides that "[w]ithin one year after approval, a
consent may be revoked for fraud or duress practiced by the person, department, or agency
requesting the consent or for lack of mental competency on the part of %heperson giving the
consent at the time the consent was given."
35. In re A.S., 65 Wash. App. 631, 635, 829 P.2d 791, 793 (1992); In re Adoption of Hernandez,
25 Wash. App. 447, 455, 607 P.2d 879, 884 (1980).
36. In re Adoption of Baby Girl K, 26 Wash. App. 897, 904, 615 P.2d 1310, 1315 (1980), review
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1003 (1981).
37. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160(3) (1994).
38. In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702, 707, review dealed, 95 Wash. 2d 1019
(1981).
39. In re Adoption of Baby Girl K, 26 Wash. App. at 905, 615 P.2d at 131,5.
40. In re Adoption of Baby Nancy, 27 Wash. App. 278, 284, 616 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1980).
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C.

Adoption Procedure

In adoptions through DSHS or an agency, the biological parents
relinquish parental rights, give custody of the child to the agency or
department, and consent to adoption.4' As noted above, DSHS may also
obtain authority to place a child for adoption as a result of the
termination of parental rights to a dependent child.42 In either case, the
custodial agency is empowered to place the child with prospective
adoptive parents and consent to the proposed adoption. 3
The statute requires that a "preplacement report" be filed with the
court before a child is placed with prospective adoptive parents." A
preplacement report is a general assessment of the individuals' fitness to
be adoptive parents-which is produced by an agency, department, or
court-approved individual.4 " The report makes a recommendation to the
court regarding their fitness, based upon a study of their home, family,
health, economic resources, and criminal records.46 Any person may at
any time request the preparation of a preplacement report, even if no
adoption petition has been filed.47 The custodial agency generally creates
the preplacement report4g and uses this initial assessment of prospective
adoptive parents to determine whether they are suitable for a particular
child.49 Although the Washington statute specifically authorizes a
custodial agency to make a report on a petitioner for adoption of a child
in its custody,5" nothing in the statute prevents an individual from
obtaining a preplacement report from a qualified entity or individual
different from the child's custodian.

41. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.080 (1994).
42. See supranotes 26-29 and accompanying text.
43. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.210,26.33.090(5) (1994).
44. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.180 (1994). An exception in made in cases in which a prospective
adoptive parent seeks to adopt his or her spouse's child. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.220 (1994).
45. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.190 (1994); see also James B. Boskey, Placing Childrenfor
Adoption, in Hollinger, supranote 11, § 3.03 [3] (discussing various purposes of a "home study").
46. Preplacement reports can range in quality from superficial approvals to thorough evaluations.
As a result, the usefulness can vary considerably depending upon the investigator. Hollinger, supra
note 11, § 4.12.
47. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.190(5) (1994). If no adoption petition has been filed, the report is
indexed in the name of the person requesting the report. Any subsequent reports must be filed
together with the original report. Id.
48. See, e.g., Adoption Through the Division of Children and Family Services, DSHS 22-702X;
James B. Boskey, PlacingChildrenfor Adoption, in Hollinger, supranote 11, § 3.03[3].
49. Hollinger, supranote 11, § 3.03[3].
50. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.210 (1994).
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Under the Washington adoption statute, any person who is at least
eighteen years old and legally competent may become an adoptive
parent." A "prospective adoptive parent" initiates the adoption process
by filing with the court a petition to adopt a specific chi[d. 2 The petition
must include a preplacement report and, if it has been executed, written
consent to adoption by the child's legal custodian. 3
Once a prospective adoptive parent files an adoption petition, the
court must order the making of a "post-placement report" to evaluate the
placement and determine if it is in the best interests of the child. 4 The
report generally must be filed with the court within sixty days after it is
ordered,55 after which time the court determines whether the proposed
adoption is in the best interests of the child. 6
II.

IN RE DEPENDENCY OF G.C.B.

A.

Facts

When G.C.B. was six months old, DSHS initiated dependency
proceedings, alleging that his biological mother, Megan Lucas, had
abandoned him. The court placed the child in foster care. 8 The state
supported the dependency petition with evidence that the mother had a
history of mental instability, substance abuse, suicide attempts, and
juvenile offenses. 9 The court declared the child dependent on January
24, 1991, and ordered that he remain in foster care.6"

51. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.140(2) (1994).
52. The adoption statute provides that "[a]n adoption proceeding is initiated by filing with the
court a petition for adoption. The petition shall be filed by the prospective acoptive parent." Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.33.150(1) (1994).
53. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.150 (1994). The court can, however, dispcnse with the agency's
consent to the adoption. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.170 (1994).
54. The adoption statute provides that at tha time the petition for adoption is filed, the court shall
order a post-placement report made to determine the nature and adequacy o the placement and to
determine if the placement is in the best interests of the child. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.200 (1994).
55. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.200 (1994).
56. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.240 (1994).
57. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 709, 870 P.2d 1037, 1039, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
58. Id. at 710, 870 P.2d at 1039.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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In June 1992, G.C.B. was returned to his mother, who had since
married and given birth to another child.6 Less than one month later,
Ms. Lucas told DSHS that she wished to return the child to foster care.62
On August 12, 1992, she signed a "Relinquishment of Custody [and]
Consent to Termination/Adoption," which was approved by a court order
on September 8, 1992.63 In response to complaints from Ms. Lucas's
grandmother regarding the relinquishment process, DSHS requested a
hearing to establish that the relinquishment was voluntary. 6' During the
hearing, Ms. Lucas acknowledged that she had signed the relinquishment
papers, that no one had threatened her, that she had expressed a desire to
relinquish her child, and that she had made her decision voluntarily after
consulting with her attorney. On October 15, 1992, the court issued an
order approving the relinquishment and consent to adoption,66
concluding that Ms. Lucas's decision was a "knowing, voluntary and
intelligent decision made free from any coercion or duress."'67
While the court considered the voluntary relinquishment issue, DSHS
filed a petition for involuntary termination of the parent-child
relationship.6" The court considered the voluntary relinquishment of
custody by Ms. Lucas to be evidence that it was unlikely that parental
deficiencies would be remedied so as to permit the return of the child to
the home in the near future.69 The court thus entered an "Order

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 710-11, 870 P.2d at 1039.
65. Id. at 711,870 P.2d at 1039.
66. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order of Approval of Relinquishment of Custody,
Consent to Termination/Adoption & Waiver of Right to Receive Notice of Proceedings at 3-4, In re
Dependency of G.C.B., No. 90-7-00079-1 (Super. Ct. Juv. Div. Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Approval
of Relinquishment], rev'don other grounds, 73 Wash. App. 708, 870 P.2d 1037, review denied, 124
Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).

67. Id. at 3.
68. Petition for Termination of Parent-Child Relationship at 1, In re Dependency of G.C.B., No.

90-7-00079-1 (Super. Ct. Juv. Div. Sept. 15, 1992), rev'd on othergrounds, 73 Wash. App. 708, 870
P.2d 1037, review denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994). Although the adoption statute specifies that a
court must enter an order terminating the parent-child relationship when it approves a voluntary
relinquishment petition, the court did not do so in this case. Approval of Relinquishment at 3-4, In
re Dependency of G.C.B. (No. 90-7-00079-1).
69. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order Terminating Parent-Child Relationship at 3, In
re Dependency of G.C.B., No. 90-7-00079-1 (Super. Ct. Juv. Div. Dec. 21, 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 73 Wash. App. 708, 870 P.2d 1037, review denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
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Terminating Parent-Child Relationship" under the dependency statute on
December 22, 1992, and granted DSHS permanent custody of the child.7"
G.C.B. moved through several foster homes with a potential for
adoption, but none proved satisfactory.7 1 In September 1993, DSHS
planned to place G.C.B. with a male, homosexual zouple whom the
Department had selected as prospective adoptive parents for the child.72
Ms. Lucas learned of the proposed placement and, at least in part because
she did not want the child to be adopted by homosexuals, a filed a
"Petition to Revoke Consent" in juvenile court.74 Her efforts to prevent
the child's placement with the couple were unsuccessfil, and G.C.B. was
transferred to their home on September 21, 1993.' 5 While the petition to
revoke consent was pending, Ms. Lucas and her husband filed a petition
to adopt the child in superior court.76 The petition included the requisite
preplacement report recommending that the court grant the petition.77
The Lucases then moved that the child be placed in their home so that a
post-placement report could be made.78
B.

Legal Issues

The trial court ordered that G.C.B. be placed with the Lucases.7 9
Since the statute requires a judge to order the making of a post-placement
report when a complete petition to adopt has been filed by prospective
adoptive parents, the judge found that the statute mandated placing the
70. Id. at 5.
71. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 711, 870 P.2d 10.7, 1040, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
72. Id. The two men are licensed foster parents. Mom Changes MindB':t Gay Couple Wants To
Adopt Son, The Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 21, 1993, at 5.
73. Ms. Lucas argued that her consent should be revoked because it was obtained through duress
and fraud on the part of DSHS and she was not mentally competent when it was made. In re
Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. at 712, 870 P.2d at 1040. Although Ehe has said that she was
not trying to regain custody because the couple is gay, she also made numerous statements regarding
her opposition to adoption of G.C.B.by homosexuals and her belief that he was going to be adopted
by heterosexual parents. Id.; see also Michele Ingrassia & Melissa Rossi, The Limits of Tolerance,
Newsweek, Feb. 14, 1994, at 47; Mother Fights a Son's Adoption by Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Jan.
1, 1994, at 8; Two Gay Lovers Fight to Adopt Three-Year-Old, CNN, Sept 21, 1993, available in,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File.
74. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. at 711-712, 870 P.2d at 1040.
75. Id. at 712, 870 P.2d at 1040.
76. Id. at 713, 870 P.2d at 1040.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 714, 870 P.2d at 1041.
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child with the petitioners." The trial judge asserted that- danger to a
child's welfare is the only reason that a judge should not order placement
with petitioners."'
DSHS appealed the trial court's order requiring that the child be
placed with the Lucases. 2 The court of appeals held that the biological
mother's petition to adopt was fatally flawed because the statutory
provision regarding termination of the parent-child relationship under the
dependency statute deprives a parent of standing to appear in all legal
proceedings involving his or her child." Although neither party had
brought this provision to the attention of the appellate court, the court
found the language dispositive.f
Although the appellate court was able to dispense with Ms. Lucas's
petition on the basis of a lack of standing, it found the trial court's
interpretation of Washington adoption law so erroneous as to warrant
further comment on some of the issues raised by the case.85 The court
discussed whether the statutory provisions regarding post-placement
reports give petitioners the right to obtain placement of the child whom
they wish to adopt. The court asserted that adoption is not open to any
and every person who may wish to adopt a particular child. 6 The court
reasoned that satisfaction of general eligibility criteria for adoptive
parenthood does not convert an individual into a "prospective adoptive
parent" with the right to petition to adopt and to demand placement of a
specific child. 7
The statute is silent as to whether additional
qualifications are necessary to convert an eligible individual into a
prospective adoptive parent, 8 or whether filing an adoption petition is
sufficient. Nevertheless, the court concluded that both "common sense"
and Washington case law give the custodial agency the authority to

80. Id.. When the judge learned that the gay couple planned to file a competing petition to adopt
G.C.B., he delayed the order to transfer the child for a month so that the gay couple would be able to
obtain a post-placement report without having the child returned to them later. Id.
81. Id. at 715, 870 P.2d at 1041.
82. Id. at 709, 870 P.2d at 1038.
83. Id. at 716-17, 870 P.2d at 1042. The court also found that since a married petitioner's spouse
is required by RCW 26.33.150(4) to join the petition to adopt, Wade Lucas was also ineligible to
petition to adopt the child. Id. at 718, 870 P.2d at 1043.
84. Id. at 717, 870 P.2d at 1042.
85. Id. at 718-19, 870 P.2d at 1043-44.
86. Id. at 719, 870 P.2d at 1044.
87. Id.
88. Id., 870 P.2d at 1043.
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choose, and thus limit, who will be the prospective adoptive parents for a
particular child.89
III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED BY !NRE DEPENDENCYOF
G.C.B.
The wording of the termination provision in the adoption statute
creates at least two situations where a parent whose rights have been
terminated may be able to re-establish parental rights by subsequently
petitioning to adopt the child. This result violates the principle of finality
of relinquishment, is detrimental to the public adoption system, and is
contrary to the child's best interests. Additionally, 1he current statute
does not limit who has standing to petition to adopt a particular child.
Wide-open standing to petition to adopt a particular child does not
adequately respect the child's need for continuity of care, the child's
perspective on relationships, or the efforts of adoption agencies to find
suitable, stable homes for children.
A.

Termination Under the Ad9ption Statute Should Preclude
Subsequent Petitionsto Adopt the Same Child

The appellate court inIn re Dependency of G.C.B. held that Ms. Lucas
lacked standing to petition to adopt the child whom she previously had
relinquished because the termination order had been entered under the
dependency statute.9" Although Ms. Lucas initially relinquished her
parental rights voluntarily, DSHS pursued an involuntary termination,
and the termination order was entered under the dependency statute,
rather than under the adoption statute.9' Thus, the appellate court's
opinion did not address the issue of whether a parent who voluntarily
relinquishes her child and has her parental rights terminated under the
adoption statute could seek to re-establish parental rights through a
subsequent adoption petition.
Termination under the adoption statute as now written does not
necessarily prohibit an individual whose parental rights have been
terminated from subsequently petitioning to adopt the child either when
89. Id., 870 P.2d at 1044.
90. Id. at 716-17, 870 P.2d at 1042.
91. Id. at 710, 716, 870 P.2d at 1039, 1042; see also Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law &
Order Terminating Parent-Child Relationship at 5, In re Dependency of G.C.B., No. 90-7-00079-1
(Super. Ct. Juv. Div. Dec. 21, 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 73 Wash. App. 708, 870 P.2d 1037,
review denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
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no other individual has filed an adoption petition or when the court
permits the individual to contest or participate in proceedings initiated by
another petitioner. Although the termination provision in the adoption
statute has been held to deprive a biological parent of the right to
visitation with the child following termination,92 there is no Washington
case law construing the effect of this subsection on a parent's standing to
file a petition to adopt the child. Unlike the termination provision under
the dependency statute, which denies standing at "any further legal
proceedings concerning the child,"93 the provision in the adoption statute
only specifies that the terminated parent loses the right to contest or
participate in proceedings "for the adoption of the child by another."94
Thus, the plain language of the adoption statute does not address a
situation in which no other petition for adoption has been filed.
Furthermore, even if another person has already petitioned to adopt the
child, the provision authorizes a judge to waive the limitations imposed
upon parents whose relationship was terminated.95
If the order terminating Ms. Lucas's parent-child relationship had
been entered under the adoption statute-an appropriate authority given
the voluntary nature of her relinquishmene 6-the termination provision
may not have been a legitimate ground on which to dismiss her petition.
She was not participating in the proceedings for adoption of the child by
another, because the gay foster parents had not filed a petition to adopt
when the Lucases filed their petition.97 Even if another petition had
already been filed, the trial court-possibly out of sympathy for her
biological link to the child or opposition to gay adoption-could have
issued an order authorizing her to participate. This possible result
contravenes the principle of finality of relinquishment, jeopardizes the
integrity of the adoption process, and is not in the best interests of
children.

92. In re Welfare of Ferguson, 41 Wash. App. 1, 8, 701 P.2d 513, 517-18, review denied, 104
Wash. 2d 1008 (1985). This case, however, involved an attempt by a biological parent to enter into
an "open adoption" agreement in which his children would be adopted by another person, but he
would retain visitation rights. See also In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 572-73,
815 P.2d 277, 283 (1991) (finding that termination of parental rights precludes visitation rights for
father).
93. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.200 (1994).
94. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.130(4) (1994).
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
97. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 714, 870 P.2d 1037, 1041, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
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Allowing the TerminatedParentto Petition to Adopt the Same
Child Undermines the Finalityof Relinquishment

1.

The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged that competing
policy considerations affect the issue of the finality of parental
relinquishment and consent to adoption.9" On the one hand, the statutory
procedures seek to protect parents from making a hurned, pressured, or
ill-informed decision to give up their child.99 The statute thus requires a
judicial hearing no sooner than forty-eight hours after the birth of the
child to ensure that the relinquishment and consent to adopt were
executed validly.0 0 Parents may revoke a valid consent at any time
before it is approved by a court or during the forty-eightt hours after the
birth of the child. 01 For up to a year after approval, a court may order
the revocation of consent obtained through fraud or duress, or while the
parent was mentally incompetent.'
Protection of the biological parents' interests competes with the desire
to rapidly place children with individuals who are likely to become
permanent caregivers.0 3 Washington courts have thus recognized a
legislative intent to promote the rapidity, certainty, and finality of
consent.' 4 The asserted policy rationales behind a limited revocation
right include respect for the strong emotional ties formed between the
child and the prospective adoptive parents.0 5 Courts also have found it
contrary to the best interests of the child to allow a biological parent to
voluntarily give up the child and then later subject the child to another
change of custody.'
Finally, permitting the biologic:al parents to set
aside consent injects uncertainty into the relationship between the child
and the prospective adoptive parents, which is contrary to the public's
interest in encouraging capable people to adopt. 7
In re Dependency of G.C.B demonstrates the potential negative
consequences of allowing parents to bypass revocation limits. The child
had already been through several unsuccessful placements, as well as in
98. In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wash. 2d 945, 949, 578 P.2d 33, 36 (1978).
99. Joan H. Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in Hollinger, supra note 11, § 2.1 l[1][a].
100. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.90 (1994).
101. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160(2) (1994).
102. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.160(3) (1994).
103. Hollinger, supranote 11, § 2.11 [l][a].
104. In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wash. 2d 945, 949, 578 P.2d 33, 36 (1978).
105. Id. at 950, 578 P.2d at 36.
106. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
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and out of his biological mother's care. 0 s The gay couple met with the
child six or seven times for as long as four days, after which DSHS
determined that the child and prospective adoptive parents were wellsuited to each other.'0 9 The attempt to regain custody by Ms. Lucas
disrupted the existing adoption plan, threatened to subject the child to
another move, and quite possibly destabilized the relationship between
the child and his caregivers. It is possible that other individuals
contemplating adoption might be intimidated by the prospect of similarly
facing competition from a former parent.
Allowing a person whose parental relationship has been voluntarily
terminated to petition to adopt the child undermines legislative
efforts-manifest in the limitations governing revocation-to protect the
child, the adoptive parents, and the integrity of the adoption process from
equivocating parents. In re Dependency of G.C.B. demonstrates how
giving terminated parents standing to adopt their child creates a loophole
in the limitations on the revocation of consent. After filing her petition
to adopt, Ms. Lucas brought a motion to dismiss her petition to revoke
consent."0 She admitted that her decision was motivated by a concern
that a successful revocation of consent would likely be followed by state
efforts to involuntarily terminate her parental rights."' By focusing on
adoption, she hoped to avoid that possibility."' Although her strategy
ultimately proved unsuccessful because the termination of parental rights
was entered under the dependency statute,"1 the same result might not
have followed if the termination order had been entered under the
adoption statute. Thus, the current statutory provisions governing the
effects of termination under the adoption statute potentially provide
opportunities for subverting the legislative goal of ensuring the finality
of relinquishment and consent to adoption.

108. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 711, 870 P.2d 1037, 1040, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
109. Dee Norton, Possible Gay Couple's Adoption Bid Halted,Seattle Times, Sept. 11, 1993, at
AIO.
110. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. at 714, 870 P.2d at 1041.
111. Id. Her parental rights had, in fact, already been terminated under the provisions governing
involuntary termination. See supra note 70 and accompanying text
112. 73 Wash. App. at 714, 870 P.2d at 1041.
113. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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Petitionsto Adopt Contraryto Agency PlansJeopardize the
Integrity of the Adoption System

When a child is relinquished to a custodial agency, the agency
acquires the authority to place that child for adoption." 4 An agency
performs various services throughout the adoption process, including
conducting preplacement studies to evaluate the fitness of prospective
adoptive parents, choosing appropriate adoptive parents for the specific
child, introducing the child into the adoptive home, and preparing a postplacement report to be used by the court." 5 In Washington State,
adoption services provided by DSHS include arranging an initial meeting
between the child and the prospective adoptive parents, supervising a
period of visitation, and determining whether the placement should
occur. Following placement, DSHS workers continue to meet with the
new family regularly to answer questions and provide referral
information for medical and social support services." 6
The adoption services provided by custodial agencies are particularly
important because many of the children have "special needs."
Prospective adoptive children are considered to have special needs if
they are older; members of an ethnic minority; have physical, mental, or
emotional problems; or are part of a sibling group." 7 Public adoption
agencies work primarily with children who have been abused and
neglected."' Most of the children available through DSHS are six years
of age or older."' Languishing in foster care exacerbates the trauma
already experienced by the child and decreases the likl-elihood that the
child will ever be adopted. 20 Because of the preference that most
adoptive parents have for healthy infants, custodial agencies
must
2
'
children.'
these
for
parents
adoptive
prospective
recruit
actively

114. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.090 (1994).
115. James B. Boskey, PlacingChildrenfor Adoption, in Hollinger, supra note 11, § 3.03[3]
116. Adoption Through the Division of Children and Family Services, DSH$ 22-702X (Rev.
10/92).
117. Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children with SpecialNeeds, 3 Fuaire of Children 62, 62
(Spring 1993).
118. Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents ofAmerican Adoption, 3 Future of Children 17, 24 (Spring
1993).
119. Adoption Through the Division of Children and Family Services, DSHS 22-702(X) (Rev.
10/92).
120. McKenzie, supra note 117, at 63.
121. Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption: Overview and Major Recommendatio.?, 3 Future of Children
43,45 (Spring 1993).
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The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that' custodial
agencies must invest time and effort in finding suitable prospective
adoptive parents and developing an adoption plan with them." Courts
also have acknowledged the public interest in a system that encourages
capable individuals to adopt." Allowing an individual, such as Ms.
Lucas, to disrupt the adoption plans of custodial agencies has a
detrimental effect upon both the investment of public funds in the
adoption process and the willingness of individuals to become adoptive
parents.
3.

PermittingParentsWho Voluntarily RelinquishedTheir Child to
Later Petition to Adopt That Same ChildIs Not in the Best Interests
of the Child

Social scientists and child development experts offer support to the
argument that allowing a parent to undo relinquishment and disrupt
adoption plans for the child is contrary to the child's best interests. For
example, the authors of the influential book Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child advocated radical changes in the legal guidelines governing
child placement decisions in order to reflect psychoanalytic knowledge
about child development. 24
They recommended that placement
decisions support the child's need for continuity of care and respect his
or her different sense of time.1 5
The purported need for continuity of care for children is based on the
observation that stability in relationships, surroundings, and environment
is necessary for a child's development. 26 The authors of Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child found that people experience disruptions in
continuity differently, depending on their ages. 2 7 For example, repeated
disruptions in caregiving can limit the ability of infants and young
children to form emotional attachments. 2 A change in who parents a
child can have a regressive effect upon the child's affections, skills,

122. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 120 n.2, 346 P.2d 672, 678 n.3 (1959).
123. In re Adoption of Baby Nancy, 27 Wash. App. 278,283,616 P.2d 1263, 1267 (1980).
124. Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 7 (1979).
125. Id. at40.
126. Id. at 31. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized the "importance of stability and
predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parentfigure is not the naturalparent."
McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299,310,738 P.2d 254,261 (1987) (emphasis added).
127. Goldstein, supra note 124, at 32.
128. ld. at 33.
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achievemeitts, and social adaptations.'29 Likewise, a move from one
house to another may be experienced as a terrible loss by a young child
who is unable to rationally assess the reasons for the change. 3
The authors of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child also
recommended that placement decisions reflect the child's, not the
adults,' sense of time.'
They asserted that for most children younger
than five years, a parental absence lasting longer than two months is
perceived as a permanent loss, and new attachments begin to develop
with the current caregiver.'
To accommodate this difference in
perspective, the authors would require that placement decisions be made
promptly and with finality.'33
Studies of how well children adjust to adoption also support the need
to guard relinquishment decisions from subsequent equivocation by
biological parents.
For example, one researcher compared the
adjustment of children (at various intervals between the ages of eleven
and twenty-three) who were adopted, brought up by biological mothers,
or raised in long-term foster homes.' 34 The biological mothers initially
had registered with an adoption agency, but changed their decisions
about giving up their children.'3 5 The researcher found a considerable
risk of social maladjustment and school failure among the children raised
by biological mothers who originally had planned to relinquish their
children for adoption.'3 6 In contrast, the study found that adopted
children had outcomes similar to the population at large.'3 7 Because of
the high frequency of criminal behavior and substance abuse among the
biological parents, the researcher concluded that adoption largely
reduced the risk of these behaviors being passed on to children.'38
Finally, the study found that foster children tended to compare

129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 12-13.
131. Id. at 40.
132. Id. at 40-41.
133. Id. at 43-45.
134. Michael Bohman & S~ren Sigvardsson, Outcome in Adoption: Lesscns from Longitudinal
Studies, in The Psychology of Adoption 93, 97 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds.,
1990).
135. Id. at 96. Most of the biological mothers were young, unmarried, and worked in unskilled or
semi-skilled jobs. Id. at 97.
136. Id. at 105.
137. Id. at 104.
138. Id. at 104-05.
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unfavorably with adopted children at various ages, 139 suggesting that
agency efforts to move children from foster care to adoptive placements
should not be jeopardized.
Studies considering the psychological vulnerability of adopted
children similarly suggest that children might be better off with their
adoptive families than if they had been reared by their biological parents.
When researchers use as controls children from an environment
comparable to that of the adoptive family, studies often conclude that
adopted children face a relatively higher risk of adjustment problems. 4 °
On the other hand, when adopted children are compared to children from
backgrounds similar to those of their biological families, they often
compare favorably. 4 ' Although the state cannot transfer children from
their biological parents simply because others would make better

139. Id. at 105. Bohman noted that the foster placements in the study could be considered "de
facto adoptions" because most of the children were placed at an early age (mean age nine months)
for a permanent stay and about seventy percent were legally adopted before age seven. He suggested
that the "strongly negative outcome" among foster children might be attributable, at least in part, to a
lack of preparation of foster parents as compared to adoptive parents and the psychological
implications of the possibility that the child could someday be returned to the biological parent. Id.
140. David M. Brodzinsky, Long-term Outcomes in Adoption, 3 Future of Children 153, 154
(Spring 1993).
141. Id. at 159. There is no evidence that the homosexual orientation of the adoptive parents
would negatively affect the child's adjustment experience. Although there is little research in the
area of adoption by homosexuals, studies of children raised by homosexual parents suggest that fears
of a negative impact on children are unfounded. See generally Carrie Bashaw, Comment, Protecting
Children in NontraditionalFamilies: Second Parent Adoptions in Washington, 13 U. Puget Sound
L. Rev. 321, 342 (1990) (finding that "the similarities between children raised by heterosexual
parents and children raised by lesbian parents far outweigh the differences") (citing Richard Green et
al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison With Solo-Parent HeterosexualMothers
and Their Children, 15 Archives Sexual Behav. 2:167 (1986); Richard Green, The Best Interests of
the Child With a Lesbian Mother, 10 Bull. of the Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 1, 14 (1982);
Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-ParentHouseholds: Psychosexualand Psychiatric
Appraisal, 24 J. Child. Psychology & Psychiatry 4:551 (1983)); Jeffrey S. Loomis, Comment, An
Alternative Placementfor Children in Adoption Law: Allowing Homosexuals the Right to Adopt, 18
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 631,661 (1992) (noting that research has disproved assertions that children raised
by homosexual parents are more likely to be stigmatized, to face a greater risk of molestation, or to
be homosexual) (citing Encyclopedia of Homosexuality 947 (Wayne K. Dynes ed., 1990); Marianne
T. O'Toole, Gay Parenting:Myths and Realities, 9 Pace L. Rev. 129, 145-46 (1989); Rhonda R.
Rivera, Legal Issues in Gay and Lesbian Parenting,Gay and Lesbian Parents 199, 211 (Frederick
W. Bozett ed., 1987)). The Washington Supreme Court has held that "homosexuality in and of itself
is not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of visitation," and thus requires evidence that the
parent's sexual orientation could endanger the child's physical, mental, or emotional health if
homosexuality is to be a determining factor in the court's decision. In re Marriage of Cabalquinto,
100 Wash. 2d 325, 329, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (1983), appeal after remand, 43 Wash. App. 518, 718
P.2d 7 (1986). There is likewise no reason to assume that the homosexuality of adoptive parents
would be detrimental to a child's welfare so as to outweigh the child's need for continuity of care.
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parents, 42 this research suggests that once a biological parent has
voluntarily relinquished and consented to the adoption of her child, and
the parent-child relationship has been legally terminated, the child may
fare better with the adoptive family.
Application of these social science and child development
perspectives to In re Dependency of G.C.B. supports the argument that
allowing Ms. Lucas to petition to adopt the child would be contrary to
G.C.B.'s best interest. Ms. Lucas voluntarily relinquished the child for
adoption.'4 3 The child had been separated from his biological mother for
over a year when she filed her petition to adopt'"--which may very well
constitute a permanent separation from the child's perspective. The
move would disrupt the continuity of care between the child and his
current custodians and potentially delay his integration into a permanent
home. These theories and studies suggest that the best outcome for
G.C.B. would be to allow him to be adopted by his current caregivers, as
opposed to returning him to his biological mother.
B.

Standingto Petition to Adopt a Specific Child Shotld Be Limited to
Individuals With Agency Consent or With Whom the ChildHas
Been PlacedRecently

In re Dependency of G.C.B. also raised questions about who has
standing to petition to adopt a specific child. The trial judge found that
the Lucases were legal strangers to the child and thus had the same right
to petition to adopt the child as any other person who satisfies the
eligibility requirements under the adoption statute.'45 The appellate
court, on the contrary, found that meeting the minimum eligibility
criteria does not convert a person into a "prospective adoptive parent"
with the right to commence adoption proceedings and demand placement
of the child. The court said that it would not construe the adoption
statute to allow any interested party to petition to adopt the same child,
thus turning the adoption determination into a bidding war.1 46 Rather, it
is the prerogative of the custodial agency to designate who may petition

142. In re Moseley, 34 Wash. App. 179, 186, 660 P.2d 315, 319, review denied, 99 Wash. 2d
1018 (1983).
143. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 710-11, 870 P.2d 1037, 1039, review
denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
144. Id. at 710, 713, 870 P.2d at 1039-40.
145. Id. at 715, 870 P.2d at 1042. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
146. 73 Wash. App. at 722, 870 P.2d at 104.5-46.
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to adopt the child. 147 Although the court offered several policy rationales

against unlimited standing to petition to adopt a particular child, 141 it is
not clear from Washington statutory and case law that standing is limited
to those individuals who have been designated as prospective adoptive
parents for a specific child by the custodial agency.
1.

The Washington StatuteDoes Not Expressly Limit Standing to
Petition to Adopt

As the trial court in In re Dependency of G.C.B. recognized, the
Washington adoption statute does not expressly limit who can petition to
adopt a particular child. State adoption statutes use one of three general
approaches to establish the criteria governing an individual's standing to
petition to adopt a specific child.'49 Some statutes limit petitioners to
certain categories of persons specifically described in the statute.5
Others limit petitioners to those individuals who have obtained a valid
Finally, some statutes do not limit who
consent to adopt the child.'
may petition to adopt a child.'
Statutory schemes can also combine the above approaches by
requiring that an individual possess either consent or placement to
establish standing. A recent draft of the Uniform Adoption Act
developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws' limits petitioners to individuals who (1) have been selected
as prospective adoptive parents or with whom the child has been placed
147. Id. at 719, 870 P.2d at 1044.
148. Id. at 722, 870 P.2d at 1045-46.
149. William M. Schur, Adoption Procedure,in Hollinger, supranote 11, § 4.05[3].
150. The Texas adoption statute is an example of statutes that enumerate categories of persons
who may adopt. The statute limits standing to (1) stepparents, (2) individuals who have had custody
of the child for at least thirty days following placement for adoption purposes, (3) individuals who
had custody for at least two of the three months prior to filing a petition to adopt, and (4) other
individuals whom the court determines to have substantial past contact sufficient to warrant
standing. The statute expressly prohibits a biological parent whose relationship with the child has
been terminated from petitioning to adopt the child, unless that person has the consent of the current
legal custodian. Tex. Farn. Code Ann. §§ 11.03(d), (g), (h) (West 1986).
151. The Georgia statute provides that satisfaction of eligibility criteria enables an individual to
apply to the custodial agency for consideration. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-3 (1991). The Georgia
Supreme Court has held that the statute creates standing to apply to the custodial agency, but not to
contest the legal custodian's absolute discretion in granting the consent necessary for adoption.
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 1976), review
denied, 432 U.S. 905 (1977). Agency consent thus effectively limits standing to adopt.
152. Hollinger, supra note 11, § 4.05[3][a].
153. Unif. Adoption Act (Tentative Draft 1994).
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for purposes of adoption, or (2) have not been selected as prospective
adoptive parents, but who have physical custody of the child.1 4 The in
re Dependency of G.C.B. appellate court recommended that the
legislature limit standing to individuals with custodial agency consent or
individuals who did not have agency consent but who had had the child
placed in their care at some point.'55 In making this recommendation, the
court of appeals implicitly acknowledged that the current statutory
provisions do not expressly limit standing to adopt.
2.

Washington Case Law RegardingStanding to Petition to Adopt
Suggests BroadAccess

The question of standing generally does not arise in cases in which a
petition for adoption is uncontested. 6 For example, when a parent
validly consents to the adoption of his or her child by a specific, eligible
person, no one is likely to question the standing of that person to petition
to adopt the child. Whether an individual has standing to adopt a
particular child becomes an issue when parents or custodians do not
consent to an adoption petition, or when more than one party seeks to
adopt the same child. 7
Although no Washington cases before In re Dependency of G.C.B.
specifically addressed the issue of who has standing to adopt, cases
involving competing adoption petitions suggest a broader access to
petition to adopt than the court of appeals acknowledged. For example,
In re Adoption of Garay involved former foster parents who petitioned to
adopt after the custodial agency placed the child with another couple for
adoption purposes. 8 Although the trial judge ultimately entered a
decree of adoption for the parents chosen by the agency,'59 he did not
deny the competing party standing to petition to adopt the child. On the
contrary, the court joined the competing petitioners as intervenors in the

154. Id. § 3-301.
155. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 723, 870 P.2d 1037, 1046, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994). The court of appeals also recommended that an individual be allowed to
petition to adopt if he or she can convince the court that "the custodian'; preadoptive planning,
entitled to a presumption of correctness, is so utterly devoid of merit as to constitute an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority, or that the custodian has abdicated its auttkority by failing to take
any preadoptive planning measures whatsoever." Id.
156. Hollinger, supra note 11, § 4.05[3].
157. Id.
158. In re Adoption of Garay, 75 Wash. 2d 184, 185-86,449 P.2d 696, 698 (1969).
159. Id. at 188, 449 P.2d. at 699.
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adoption proceeding and considered their evidence." 6 In other cases
involving competing adoption petitions, or petitions lacking agency
consent, courts have not refused to evaluate petitions on the basis of a
lack of standing.'
However, these cases occurred before the enactment
of the current provision requiring a post-placement report. 62
3.

Post-PlacementReport RequirementInjects UncertaintyInto the
Issue of Who Has Authority to Make DecisionsRegardingAdoptive
Placements

Under the current statute, a court must order the making of a postplacement report when the petition for adoption is filed, in order to
assess the placement. 61 The court cannot schedule a hearing on the
petition for adoption until both the preplacement and post-placement
reports have been filed."6 These provisions governing the court's
evaluation of an adoption petition say nothing regarding who is
authorized to make placement decisions. Because the statute does not
specifically limit who may be an adoptive parent to individuals who have
had a child placed with them for adoption purposes, 6s the trial judge in
In re Dependency of G.C.B. found that the fact that DSHS had not placed
the child with the Lucases did not prevent them from pursuing the
adoption. 66 The trial court assumed that it must have had the authority
to order a placement in order to evaluate the petition in accordance with
the post-placement report requirement. 67
The court of appeals asserted that nothing in the legislation requiring
the making of post-placement reports indicated a legislative intent to take
placement decisions from custodial agencies.
As the court recognized,
provisions in the statute expressly authorize custodial agencies to place

160. Id. at 187, 449 P.2d. at 699.
161. See, e.g., In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 346 P.2d 672 (1959); In re Baby Girl Doe, 45
Wash. 2d 644, 277 P.2d 321 (1954); In re Hamilton, 41 Wash. 2d 53,246 P.2d 849 (1952).
162. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.200 (1994).
163. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.200 (1994). See supranotes 54-56 and accompanying text.
164. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.240(1) (1994).
165. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.140 (1994).
166. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 716, 870 P.2d 1037, 1042, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
167. Id. at 714, 870 P.2d at 1041.
168. Id. at 721, 870 P.2d at 1045.
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children who are in agency custody. 6 9 These provisions seem to give the
custodial agency the sole authority to make placement decisions, since
that authority is given to no other entity.
On the other hand, there is also no indication that the legislature
intended to limit the court's ability to decree an adoption
notwithstanding a lack of agency consent. However, this effect
necessarily follows from the court's interpretation, in that a court cannot
decree an adoption without first obtaining a post-placement report. A
court thus could decree an adoption without the consent of the agency
only if the child happened to be in the home of the prospective adoptive
parents who filed the petition, or if a post-placement report had already
been obtained. The former situation could occur if the agency made an
initial decision to place the child with foster parents or prospective
adoptive parents and later decided to remove the child, either because the
agency had chosen others to be adoptive parents or because it determined
the placement to be unsuitable. If the parents refused to release the child
to the custodial agency, but instead filed a petition for adoption, a judge
then could order a post-placement report and make a filal determination
on the petition. Alternatively, if the petitioners surrendered the child to
the agency, but still filed a petition to adopt, the judge could not obtain
the necessary post-placement report unless she could order the placement
of the child with the petitioners.
Before the enactment of the post-placement report requirement, courts
could evaluate an adoption petition even though the child was not
residing with the petitioners. The issue of authority to make placement
decisions thus did not arise and would not have affected standing to
petition to adopt. For example, in In re Infant Boy .John Doe,70 the
adoption agency placed the child with prospective adoptive parents, but
then removed the child because of questions about their fitness.171 The
court was able to evaluate the merits of the petition."'
Under the interpretation of the current statute urged by the appellate
court in In re Dependency of G.C.B., a court would be unable to evaluate
the petition in a similar case unless a post-placement report had already
been obtained prior to removal by the agency. Because there is no
169. Id. at 720 n.13, 870 P.2d at 1044 n.13. The adoption statute provides that, upon court
approval of a petition for relinquishment to a custodial agency, the court must also include an order
authorizing the agency to place the child with a prospective adoptive parenL Wash. Rev. Code §
26.33.090(5) (1994).
170. In re Infant Boy John Doe, 74 Wash. 2d 396,444 P.2d 800 (1968).
171. Id. at 397,444 P.2d at 801.
172. Id. at 402-03, 444 P.2d at 803-04.
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support for the proposition that the legislature intended to limit the
ability of courts to decree adoptions, it is not clear that the prerogative to
designate prospective adoptive parents who may petition to adopt lies
exclusively with custodial agencies. However, limitations on standing
would protect the best interests of the child, support the efforts of
adoption agencies, and encourage qualified individuals to adopt.
4.

Standing to Petition to Adopt a Specific Child Generally Should Be
Limited to Individuals Who Have Agency Consent or Who Recently
Had Custody of the Child

Although proponents of open standing to petition to adopt assert that
the process serves the child's best interests by allowing a neutral judge to
choose among competing petitions,173 there are potential negative
consequences. Open standing can interfere with a biological parent's
intent to arrange a quiet adoption with individuals of her choosing.174
The burdens of contested adoption litigation can deter prospective
adoptive parents. 75 As the In re Dependency of G.C.B. court recognized,
open standing could result in the child being placed in numerous homes
on a temporary basis as competing petitions are evaluated exhaustively
by the court.1 76 Washington courts have recognized that multiple
changes in custody are detrimental to the child's need for continuity of
care, whether from a biological parent or other parental figure.177
Unlimited standing can also push prospective adoptive parents to file for

173. William M. Schur, Adoption Procedure,in Hollinger, supra note 11, § 4.05[3][a]. Some
commentators have expressed fear that judicial discretion to determine a child's best interests allows
for decisions based upon "intuition, personal likes and dislikes, armchair psychology, and ideology
so deeply rooted that the decision makers are unaware that it is mere ideology." Lucy Cooper &
Patricia Nelson, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: A Reply ProposingLimiting
JudicialDiscretion, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1983). In a case such as In re Dependency of
G.C.B., where the proposed adoption plan of the agency would have placed the child with
homosexual parents, open standing could provide an opportunity for ajudge who opposed adoption
by homosexuals to obstruct the adoption by granting adoption to other competing petitioners.
Limitations on who has standing to petition to adopt can serve to limit the exercise of judicial
discretion.
174. Hollinger, supranote 11, § 4.05[3][a].
175. Hollinger, supranote 11, § 4.05[3][c].
176. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 722, 870 P.2d 1037, 1045, review denied,
124 Wash. 2d 1019 (1994).
177. In re Welfare of Aschauer, 93 Wash. 2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245, 1249 (1980); In re
Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. at 722 n.14, 870 P.2d at 1045 n.14.
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adoption hastily.1 8 Overall, there is a danger that the child's interests
179
will be sacrificed to the desires of competing adults.
Limiting petitioners to those who have valid agency consent
recognizes the important role that agencies play in the adoption process.
Courts lack the ability to care for children until an adoption is decreed, or
to find suitable prospective adoptive parents for available children.' As
a result, cooperation between the courts and custodial agencies is
necessary to facilitate the adoption of children whose relationships with
their biological parents have been terminated.'18 Custodial agencies
invest considerable time and money in finding prospective adoptive
parents, preparing them for adoption, and supervising placements' 8 2 An
expansive assertion of authority to make adoptive placement and
standing decisions by courts potentially undercuts the atbility of custodial
agencies to plan adoptions carefully. As the Washington Supreme Court
recommended in In re Reinius, custodial agencies should be given every
reasonable opportunity to carry out adoption planning with the full
support of, not competition from, the courts.8 3
On the other hand, the legislature has indicated a willingness to allow
courts to decree adoptions notwithstanding the lack of agency consent to
a proposed adoption. For example, a court may dispense with a custodial
agency's consent if it determines by "clear, cogent and convincing
evidence that the proposed adoption is in the best interests of the
adoptee."' 4 Until the statute was amended in 1988, a court was only
authorized to dispense with the agency's consent if it found that "the
refusal to consent to adoption [wa]s arbitrary and capricious."' 5 The
legislative rationale for amending the statute was to lower the hurdle in
front of judges who favor a proposed adoption notwithstanding an

178. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d 117, 130-31, 346 P.2d 672, 679 (1959) (Hill, J., concurring).
179. Joseph Goldstein et al., supranote 124, at 54.
180. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d at 141, 346 P.2d at 685 (Ott., J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 128, 346 P.2d at 678.
182. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
183. In re Reinius, 55 Wash. 2d at 128, 346 P.2d at 678.
184. Wash. Rev. Code § 26.33.170 (1994). Prior to 1988, a court could only dispense with
agency or department consent if it found that the "refusal to consent to adoption is arbitrary and
capricious." The legislature amended the provision because it believed that the old standard was
nearly impossible to prove and precluded courts from overcoming a refusal to consent by an agency
even if the proposed adoption was in the best interests of the child. Final Legislative Report, 50th
Washington State Legislature, 1988 First Special Session 132 (1988).
185. Laws 1984, cl. 155, § 17 (amended 1988).
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agency's refusal to consent." 6 The legislature believed that custodial
agencies were obstructing adoptions that were in the best interests of
children. 87 As discussed above, a court's ability to decree adoptions to
petitioners who lack agency consent would be limited if the court could
not grant standing to those petitioners. The court of appeals in In re
Dependency of G.C.B. proposed that the burden should be on the
petitioner to establish that the custodial agency's adoption plan is "so
utterly devoid of merit as to constitute an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority, or that the custodian has abdicated its authority by
failing to take any preadoptive planning measures whatsoever."' 88
Unlimited standing to petition to adopt could have a deterrent effect
on the willingness of individuals to adopt. The high costs of engaging in
a court battle for a child causes some prospective adoptive parents to
withdraw from consideration to adopt a particular child rather than
endure litigation or wait for competing petitions to be evaluated.' 89 Also,
most of the children available for adoption through public agencies have
special needs, and thus require greater investments than healthy infants
in terms of recruitment and preparation of prospective adoptive
Deterrence of capable adoptive parents could have
parents. 90
detrimental long-term effects on the welfare of these children if they are
unable to be adopted.'
Last, giving standing to petition to adopt to individuals who either
currently have custody of the child or who had the child placed in their
care at some point recognizes the emotional and psychological ties that
develop between children and their caregivers. 92 However, giving
standing to any adult who had the child in his or her care at any time in
the past, no matter how distant, favors the adult's sense of time rather
than the child's. 93 In a case like In re Dependency of G.C.B., in which
the child spent little time in the care of his biological mother, granting

186. Final Legislative Report, 50th Washington State Legislature, 1988 First Special Session 132
(1988).
187. Id.
188. In re Dependency of G.C.B., 73 Wash. App. 708, 723, 870 P.2d 1037, 1046 (1994).
189. William M. Schur, Adoption Procedure,in Hollinger, supranote 11, § 4.05[3].
190. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. The child in In re Dependency of G.C.B.
was considered to have "special needs" requiring "special parenting skills." 73 Wash. App. 708, 713
n.4, 870 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.4 (1994).
191. See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
192. See supranotes 126-32 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
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standing to her would reflect not the child's perspective on the
importance of that relationship, but the mother's.
Statutory provisions governing standing to adopt should recognize and
support the important role that custodial agencies play in the adoption
process. They should also respect the child's need for continuity of care
and the child's perspective on time and relationships. 'Lastly, the statute
should provide an avenue for courts to facilitate adoptions in certain
situations in which the custodial agency has completely failed to carry
out its responsibilities.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
Whether termination is entered under the dependency or adoption
statute, it is contrary to the finality of relinquishment and the integrity of
the adoption process and detrimental to the child's emotional and
psychological development to permit the biological parent to petition to
adopt the child. The adoption statute provision governing the effect of
termination of the parent-child relationship should be amended to
prevent biological parents from subsequently petitioning to adopt the
child. This result could be achieved by amending the adoption provision
to mirror the one in the dependency statute, or by specifying that
individuals who have voluntarily relinquished custody of their child and
consented to adoption and termination are ineligible to petition to adopt
that child in the future.
The Washington adoption statute should further be amended to limit
who can petition to adopt to an individual who (1) has been selected as a
prospective adoptive parent or with whom the child has been placed for
purposes of adoption recently enough that the relationship will be
important to the child, or (2) has not been selected as a prospective
adoptive parent, but who has physical custody of the child. The statute
should also balance the desire in some circumstances to allow courts to
decree an adoption despite the lack of agency consent with the
importance of supporting the adoption planning efforts of custodial
agencies. Thus, a court should be able to order placement when a
petitioner demonstrates that the agency's planning is so utterly devoid of
merit as to constitute an arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or
that it has abdicated its authority by failing to take any preadoptive
planning measures whatsoever. These changes will protect the child and
the public adoption system from the negative consequences of unlimited
standing, while authorizing courts to facilitate adoptions when the
agencies have failed in their role.
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In In re Dependency of G.C.B., opposition to homosexual parenting
may have motivated the decision of the biological mother to attempt to
regain custody of her child and the decision of the trial judge to consider
her petition and order placement of the child with her. Although the
focus in this case was on gay parenting, similar opposition could be
inspired by the prospective adoptive parents' race, ethnicity, religion,
socio-econonic class, or marital status. The statutory provisions
governing adoption should be designed, to the extent that it is possible,
to prevent their use as tools of prejudice.

